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Abstract When saying something in a conversation, an agent publicly commits
to some interpretation of what she said, which others might dispute. But how
does making a commitment affects the commitments of others? We provide an
answer to this question for the case of acknowledgments. Commitment semantics
poses a dilemma for acknowledgments: either the semantics is strong, entailing
that agent i’s committing to ϕ entails other agents commit to i’s committing to ϕ .
This makes acknowledgments vacuous. Or further acknowledgments are required to
produce commitments about others’ commitments, but then grounding seems never
achievable in finite time. Building on Venant & Asher (2015) we provide a model
of these strong and weak semantics where we show how the two are linked via a
semantics for inductive, synchronous acknowledgments.
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1 Introduction
Hamblin (1987); Traum & Allen (1994); Traum (1994); Asher & Fernando (1997); Las-
carides & Asher (2009) inter alia argue that while a semantics without differing “points
of view” of different agents is a good first hypothesis for the analysis of the content of
monologue, dialogues typically involve differing points of view from different agents. In
particular one agent may not agree with what another agent asserts, or may have a different
interpretation of an utterance from that of its author. An adequate semantics for dialogue
should proceed by attributing to different dialogue agents separate views of the contents
of their conversation. We model this, following others, by assigning each agent her own
commitment slate. In this paper we bring out a complication with this approach that has gone
so far unnoticed in formal semantics and the prior work we just mentioned, although it is
well-known from epistemic game theory: commitment slates interact; agents typically com-
mit to the fact that other agents make certain commitments. We thus formulate the semantics
of dialogue moves and conversational goals in terms of nested, public commitments.
What is central in putting this notion of meaning to work is the dynamics of such commit-
ments. Working out this dynamics is the central contribution of the paper. We develop two
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semantics for nested commitments, one for a simple propositional language, the other for
a full description language for discourse structures of dialogues; we show how one is an
approximation of the other. We apply our dynamics to three different sorts of issues: the
problem of ambiguity, the semantics of acknowledgments and the semantics of corrections.
Before delving into technical issues, we first sketch the three issues our semantics will
address.
2 Three phenomena requiring a dynamic semantics of nested commitments
Ambiguity A particular discourse move m typically presupposes a particular commitment
on the part of m’s agent concerning the commitments that other agents have made on a prior
move n. This commitment may not be what the the author of n intended for innocuous or
strategic reasons. Here is an example (from Venant, Asher & Degremont 2014).
(1) a. C: N. isn’t coming to the meeting. It’s been cancelled.
b. A: That’s not why N. isn’t coming. He’s sick.
c. C: I didn’t say that N. wasn’t coming because the meeting was cancelled. The
meeting is cancelled because N. isn’t coming.
C’s initial contribution contains a discourse ambiguity. A has taken C to be committed to
one of its possible disambiguations when C turns out to have committed to the other. But
A is not unreasonable to take C to be committed to what he takes him to commit to, and
the ensuing exchange is about who was committed to what. To represent its meaning, we
need nested commitments combined with a means for representing potentially ambiguous
discourse moves.
Acknowledgments and corrections For many researchers, including Clark (1996); Traum
(1994); Traum & Allen (1994) inter alia, an acknowledgment as in (2c) by 0 of a discourse
move m by 1 can signal that 0 has understood what 1 has said, or that 0 has committed that 1
has committed to a content p with m, and serve to “ground” or to establish a mutual belief
that 1 has committed to p. For Clark, grounding by the other conversational participants is a
necessary condition for the content of utterances to enter the common ground. Corrections,
and self-corrections, as in (2d), on the other hand, serve to remove commitments.
(2) a. 0: Did you have a bank account in this bank?
b. 1: No sir.
c. 0: OK. So you’re saying that you did not have a bank account at Credit Suisse?
d. 1: No. sorry, in fact, I had an account there.
e. 0: OK thank you.
The problem is that grounding doesn’t follow just from the simple gloss above. With Traum
and Allen, we argue that grounding that i committed to p should require reaching a state
where a common commitment over some content K holds (e.g., typically over the fact that
i performed m and the content of m is p). A common commitment by a group of agents G
means that every agent in G is committed to K and to the fact that every agent is committed
to K, and to the fact that every agent is committed that every agent is committed to K, and
so on. But if an acknowledgment performed by agent i only brings additional levels of
commitments by i to some given content, it is far from straightforward to see how and why
grounding would be possible at all in finite time. Clark indeed mentions such a problem and
proposes that the solution lies in a continuous exchange of instantaneous and concurrent,
unspoken signals. Others like Lascarides & Asher (2009) assume implicit acknowledgments
in the absence of explicit corrections, which might provide another possible solution, for
cooperative conversations at least. But there has been no logically precise semantics of
acknowledgments that logically entail common commitments and grounding. We provide
this.
To get a clearer picture of the problem for acknowledgments, we need some assumptions. We
take public commitment to be an operator with a weak modal logic (K); an agent commits
to a proposition ϕ (Ciϕ) given a discourse move m, when m entails ϕ or when i asserts ϕ .
In general commitments do not validate type 4 axioms of modal logics; saying ϕ is not
the same as saying I commit to ϕ , and asserting ϕ does not entail asserting I assert that
ϕ . Analogously to common knowledge, we define common commitments for a group G,
C∗Gϕ , as CGϕ ∧CGCGϕ ∧ . . .CG(CG)nϕ ∧ . . . . Common commitments would follow from
assuming a perfect communication channel and a view of semantic competence implying
perfect knowledge of speaker commitments of unambiguous discourse moves.
These assumptions lead to a very strong view of assertions and other discourse moves.
If discourse move m entails p, then i’s making m entails C∗GCi p. But then grounding
acknowledgments are semantically superfluous. The only informative contribution of i’s
acknowledgment of j’s move then is that i agrees with the content of j’s move. Nevertheless,
we can imagine 1 in (2c) acknowledging 0’s response even if he patently does not believe
its content. Such acknowledgments are often present in legal questioning but in many other
conversations too.
We might opt for a much simpler semantics for discourse moves. In particular, (a) an assertion
of ϕ by speaker i only entails that Ciϕ . A similarly weak semantics for acknowledgments
would mean that (b) an acknowledgment by j of the content of an assertion by i entails
C jCiϕ . But this makes grounding impossible in finite conversations: if a discourse move
m by i entails only Ci p, (a) and (b) entail that all the conversational participants believe
Ci p (Traum & Allen 1994; Ginzburg 2012). Then j’s acknowledgment of m would entail
C jCi p∧BelGC jCi p. and BelGC. Let conversations be strings of discourse moves V
∗ by
players i and j that may be finite or infinite (Asher, Paul & Venant 2014). That is every
conversation c is such that c ∈V∞ where V∞ =V∗∪V ω . It follows by induction that
Proposition 1 A conversational sequence σ of assertions and acknowledgments verifies a
common commitment to the fact that i commits to ϕ , C∗Ciϕ only if σ ∈V
ω .
That is, common commitments are achieved only after an infinite sequence of acknowledg-
ment moves between i and j.
Some other options are logically possible. For instance, we could keep the simple semantics
for discourse moves, but assign acknowledgments a very strong semantics. On such a
semantics, j’s acknowledging a discourse move by i that entails Ciϕ would imply a common
commitment by i and j to Ciϕ . But this implausibly imputes to j the ability to force
commitments on i that quickly leads to absurdities. If i says, for instance, I don’t want to
go to the meeting, j can “acknowledge” i’s move by saying, OK, thank you very much for
agreeing to go to the meeting, thus forcing a common commitment to Ci i goes to meeting.
But clearly i didn’t commit to going to the meeting.
Can we do without common commitments? We think not. Common commitments are
essential (see also Clark 1996) for strategic reasons and can be present even when mutual
beliefs about a shared task are not. Suppose, for instance, that i’s goal is that C jϕ and that
j cannot consistently deny the commitment. If i only extracts from j a move m implying
C jϕ , j has a winning strategy for denying i victory. She simply denies committing to ϕ
(I never said that), since C j¬C jϕ is consistent with C jϕ , even if Bel jC jϕ . Player j lies,
but she is consistent. If i manages to achieve C jC jϕ , j can still similarly counter i’s goal
while maintaining consistency. j can assert something to the effect that C j¬CJC jϕ , which
means that there are worlds compatible with her commitments where ¬ϕ . However, if i
achieves the common commitment C∗GC jϕ , with G the group of conversational participants,
j does not have a way of denying her commitment without becoming inconsistent, as
C∗C jϕ → (C jC jϕ ∧C jC jC jϕ ∧⋯), for any finite depth of nesting of C j operators. And only
common commitments rule out other, more elaborate ways of defeating conversational
goals. For instance, on a weaker semantics j could deny that i had committed to what j had
committed to at some level of embedding. Thus, if i’s goal depends on j’s committing to
one of i’s commitments, a lack of common commitment will allow j to deny i’s achieving
her conversational goals.
We could have formulated the problem of grounding and common commitments in doxastic
terms: j’s acknowledgment of a move by i should lead to a mutual belief by i and j in
some content. Problems for the semantics of assertion and acknowledgments analogous
to those we have just sketched in terms of commitments will surface for an account of
grounding in terms of mutual belief. However, we believe that a semantics for dialogue in
terms of commitments is preferable for several reasons. First, commitments are public and
directly verifiable by the dialogue participants; beliefs on the other hand are private and
hidden. In addition and as a consequence, the link between the content of an utterance and
commitments is in principle clear and deductive, whereas the link from the content of an
utterance to a belief about that content only follows under strong assumptions like Gricean
Sincerity that cannot be assumed to hold of conversational participants in general. People lie
and exaggerate for various reasons, which makes the link between contents of utterances
and belief uncertain. The link between contents and commitments is not subject to such
uncertainty.
We now briefly turn to the semantics of self-corrections. While Lascarides & Asher (2009)
give a general semantics for corrections in terms of simple commitments, according to which
one speaker commits to the negation of what another speaker committed to with a prior
move, they do not look at self-corrections, which we focus on here. In self-corrections,
speakers can not only deny prior commitments but also “undo” or “erase” them with self-
corrections. For instance, if in (2b) 1 commits to not having a bank account; in (2d) 1 no
longer has this commitment. Self-corrections thus entail a revision of commitments. No one
has proposed a logical analysis of self-corrections. We provide such an analysis, showing
that these moves have an essential, strategic role to play in dialogue, even if we assume a
perfect communication channel and unambiguous commitments in dialogue moves.
3 Simple semantics for nested commitments
As a first step toward a full dynamic semantics for commitments, we consider the simple
setting of Venant & Asher (2015) on which the representation of a conversational agent’s
contributions is restricted to a propositional language with a commitment modality for each
agent. We then discuss and refine their semantics of acknowledgments, providing a more
systematic understanding of the problems sketched in section 2.
Assume a set of agents I. Agents can perform the following kinds of dialogue moves:
uttering a proposition ϕ , which we will write as ϕ!, acknowledge a previous action α , which
we will write as ack(α), or perform an ambiguous move α ∼ β , which represents a discourse
move whose performance produces an effect ambiguous between those of actions α and
β . Ambiguity will play an important role in our formal model of grounding and this final
construction.
The dynamic language LD is a classical propositional language closed under ∼, and the
operators ack and Ci. The semantics of LD exploits the following standard definitions: a
frame is a tuple ⟨W,(Ri)i∈X⟩ with W a set of so-called possible worlds and for each i ∈ I,
Ri is a binary relation over W . A model M is a pair ⟨F ,ν⟩ with F a Kripke frame and
ν ∶W ↦ ℘(PROP) an assignment at each world w of propositional variables true at w.
The semantics interprets actions of LD as action-structures of the logic of public and private
announcements (Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998). The truth of static formulae ϕ relative to
a pointed model (⟨M,w0⟩ ⊧ ϕ) is classical, with Ci a normal K-modality (⟨M,w0⟩ ⊧Ciϕ
iff ϕ holds in every world accessible via Ri from w0). The definition of action-structures
needed for the semantics of dynamic formulae [α i]ϕ is as follows:
Definition 1 (Action-structures (Baltag et al. 1998)) An action-structure is a tuple ⟨F ,k, pre⟩
where F is a frame, k ∈ F and pre ∶WF ↦ LD associates to each world in F a formula,
called the precondition of this world.
An action-structure defines how an action affects each agent’s commitments, including his
commitment over the action’s effect on others’ commitments. The following definition of
a model update does this. In informal terms, for each world k of the action structure, the
update makes a new copy W k of the model’s set of worlds, deletes from this copy every
world failing the precondition pre(k), and finally makes worlds from different copies W k
and W k
′
accessible to one another if and only if the action structure has k accessible from k′
and the model to be updated has corresponding worlds accessible to one another.
Definition 2 (Model update) Let K = ⟨F ,k0, pre⟩ be an action structure. Let ⟨M,w0⟩ be a
pointed model. Let ∣ϕ ∣M = {w ∈M ∣M,w⊧ϕ}. If w0 ∉ pre(k0) the update ⟨M,w0⟩⋆⟨K,k⟩
fails. Otherwise, the updated model, ⟨MK ,(w0,k)⟩, is defined as ⟨MK ,(w0,k)⟩ with
W K =⋃
l∈K
∣pre(l)∣M× l
as the set of worlds, accessibility relations are defined as RM
K
i ((w, l),(w′, l′)) iff (i) RMi (w,w′)
and (ii) RKi (l, l′), and valuations left unchanged i.e., ν((w, l)) = ν(w).
Since we want to model changes in commitments, the actions we use only affect agents’
commitments, and never affect actual facts. In other words, we always have pre(k0) = ⊺).
Therefore actions never fail, and updated models always exist.
We interpret pairs of actions α and agents i, α i as action-structures Jα iK. Then, the truth of a
formula [α i]ϕ isdefined as:
⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [α i]ϕ iff ⟨M,w⟩⋆Jα iK ⊧ ϕ
Venant & Asher 2015 provides two different ways of interpreting declarative actions ϕ!
as action structures, yielding two distinct dynamics of commitments. The first, the strong
semantics for assertions, systematically produces a common commitment by each agent on
Ciϕ upon i’s performing ϕ . Under this interpretation of ϕ!
i, acknowledgments are easily
shown to be semantically superfluous. A second interpretation, the “weak” semantics, only
ensures that Ciϕ holds after i has performed ϕ!; it leaves higher-order commitments as well
as other agents’ commitments unchanged. This semantics makes common commitments
unattainable by any finite sequence of acknowledgments.
We depict the action structures for the weak and strong interpretation of assertions Jϕ!iK
graphically; each circular node represents a world k of the action structure; a directed edge
leading from node k to node k′ means that Ri(k,k′):
Definition 3 (Strong and weak semantics for assertions)
Jϕ!iK in the strong semantics
k0
ki kj
i j
j
i
i j
pre(k0) = ⊤
pre(ki) = φ
pre(kj) = ⊤
Jϕ!iK in the weak semantics
k0
ki kj
i j
i, j
i, j
pre(k0) = ⊤
pre(ki) = φ
pre(kj) = ⊤
This propositional setting naturally reflects our intuitions for acknowledgments: i’s per-
forming ack(α j) should introduce a commitment by i over the fact that action α has been
performed by j, in other words, it should make i apply α j on i’s set of commitments. The
following semantics for ack(α j)i, together with the preceding definitions, yield such a
desired behavior:
Definition 4 (Semantics for acknowledgments) Let α ∈ A be a linguistic action. Let⟨Kα ,kα0 , preα⟩ = Jα jK. Let k0 and k−i be “fresh” symbols not appearing in Kα .
Jack(α j)iK = ⟨{k0,k−i}∪Kα ,k0, pre⟩
Accessibility relations are set to: Ri(k0,kα0 ), for x ≠ i, Rx(k0,k−i), ∀x ∈ I Rx(k−i,k−i), ∀k,k′ ∈
Kα ,∀x ∈ I Rx(k,k′) iff RKαx (k,k′) with no other transitions. pre(k0) = pre(k j) = ⊺ and pre
coincide with preα on Kα .
Thus, Jack(α j)iK is an action structure whose actual world is such that i is committed to
a copy of Jα jK while any other agent x is committed to a world with no precondition (and
thus x’s commitments won’t be affected when updating α i). To give a more concrete view
on acknowledgments we provide in addition on figure 1 the graphical representations of
ack(ϕ! j)i in the strong and weak semantics for utterances. In both cases, the recursive
mechanism for interpreting acknowledgments stays the same; only the interpretation of
assertions it combines with varies.
Going beyond Venant & Asher 2015, we now provide a link between the strong and weak
semantics, on which the strong semantics corresponds to an idealization of an infinite
sequence of acknowledgments. We first define such sequences:
Definition 5 (Iterated acknowledgments) Let αx ∈ A× I be an ⟨action, agent⟩ pair, let G ⊆ I
be a group of agents. Define inductively the set of ⟨action, agent⟩ pairs ↑nG (αx) as follows:
− ↑0G (αx) = {αx}
− ↑n+1G (αx) =⋃i∈G⋃β∈↑nG ack(β)i.
k0
k
α
0
k
α
j k
α
i
j i
i
j
j i
kj
i j
j
pre(kαj ) = φ
∀k 6= kαj pre(k) = ⊤
(a) Jack(ϕ! j)iK in the strong semantics
k0
k
α
0
k
α
j k
α
i
j i
i, j
i, j
kj
i j
j
pre(kαj ) = φ
∀k 6= kαj pre(k) = ⊤
(b) Jack(ϕ! j)iK in the weak semantics
Figure 1 Acknowledgments in the strong and weak semantics
Level n in the above hierarchy consists of every possible acknowledgment by every agent in G
of actions at the lower level. Note that ∣ ↑nG (αx)∣ = ∣G∣n. An easy induction shows that at each
level n, the order in which actions in ↑nG (αx) are applied to a modelM do not change the final
result; for any complete orderings β0,β1 . . .β∣G∣n and β
′
0,β
′
1, . . .β
′
∣G∣n of ↑
n
G (αx) , and for every
modelM, (. . .((⟨M,w⟩⋆β0)⋆β1)⋆ . . .)⋆β∣G∣n) and (. . .((⟨M,w⟩⋆β ′0)⋆β ′1)⋆ . . .)⋆β ′∣G∣n)
are isomorphic. Our choice of ordering of ↑nG (αx) will thus not affect our results.
Let <I be any total order on the set of agents I. We inductively extend <I to ↑
n+1
G (αx),
by defining ack(β)i <I ack(β ′) j iff i <I j or i = j and β <I β ′ (thus taking a lexicographic
ordering at each step). We write ↑n+1G (αx)k as the kth action in ↑n+1G (αx) according to
<I . We can now define the infinite sequence of actions !
ω
G(αx) = ⟨↑0G (αx)1,↑1G (αx)1,↑1G(αx)2, . . . ,↑nG (αx)1, . . . ,↑nG (αx)∣G∣n , . . .⟩ and the infinite sequence of actions ackωG(αx) =⟨!ωG(αx)⟩n∈ω . We have defined here two infinite sequences of actions: !ωG(αx) corresponds to
the sequence starting with action α executed by x followed by its acknowledgment by every
agent in G, again followed by acknowledgments of these acknowledgments by every agent
in G and so on, while ackωG(αx) corresponds to the same sequence of acknowledgments
without the initial performance of α by x.
The last ingredient needed to complete the correspondence between the strong and weak
semantics of acknowledgments is a semantics for such infinite sequences:
Assume in what follows that for any G ⊆ I, C∗G is not part of the language LD
1.
Definition 6 Let U be a pointed model and ⟨Un⟩n∈ω be an infinite sequence of models. U
is a limit model of ⟨Un⟩n∈ω iff ∀k ∈ ω∃n0 ∈ ω∀n ≥ n0 U is k-bisimilar to Un. Notice that
existence of a limit model requires ∀k∃n0∀n > n0 Un is k-bisimilar to Un−1. Let ≡ω denote k-
bisimilarity for every k ∈ ω . By transitivity of finite bisimulation, two limit models are ≡ω
1 which does not prevent us to study whether actions might yield a model where it holds
equivalent, and a ≡ω equivalent to a limit model is a limit model.
Definition 7 Let ⟨αxk
k
⟩k∈ω be an infinite sequence of ⟨action, agent⟩ pairs. Let ϕ ∈ LD ∪
C∗Gϕ ∣ G ⊆ I, and ⟨M,w⟩ be a pointed model. Define inductively U0 = ⟨M,w⟩ and Uk+1 =(Uk ⋆JαkKxk). The effects of an infinite sequence of actions are defined as follows:
− If ⟨Uk⟩k∈ω has no limit model, the effects are undefined.
− Otherwise ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [⟨αxk
k
⟩k∈ω]ϕ iff ∀U if U is a limit model of⟨Uk⟩k∈ω then U ⊧ ϕ
The following proposition links the strong and the weak semantics:
Proposition 2 For an action α , the effects of ackω(α) are always defined, moverover, let⟨M,w⟩ be a pointed model, ⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [ϕ!x]ψ in the strong semantics for utterances iff⟨M,w⟩ ⊧ [!ωI (ϕ!x)]ψ in the weak semantics.
We now have a formally precise statement of the intuition that the strong interpretation
of ϕ!x is logically equivalent to [ϕ!x][ackωI (ϕ!x)], i.e., that the strong semantics logically
behaves as if utterances were always followed by every possible acknowledgment. It also
shows something non-trivial: such infinite iterations of acknowledgments are regular enough
to be finitely representable as an update of the model. This means that we can nest such
constructions without further effort. Following the same kind of reasoning we can then
define the action acki(!ωI (ϕ!x)), to represent i’s acknowledgment of an infinite sequence of
acknowledgment yielding a common commitment over Cxϕ , and shows that this action does
the same as the “finite” one acki(ϕ!x) under the strong semantics. Our analysis regarding
infinite constructions supports our formal treatment of grounding.
Existing theories, without proposing a fully worked out semantics, solve the problem of
grounding by assuming that, at least by default, infinitely many weak acknowledgments can
synchronously be performed by conversational agents. The previous discussion establishes
that the strong semantics implements precisely such a behavior. Our proposed solution thus
complements existing ones.
4 Semantics with nested commitments for richer languages
In the preceding section, our semantics assumed a propositional language in which discourse
moves like acknowledgments were analyzed as action operators on propositions. While this
approach works for acknowledgments, it is difficult to adapt this to truly relational moves
like Correction or most discourse relations. In this section we offer a full dynamic semantics
for a language with nested commitments in which we can refer to conversational moves and
make assertions about relations between conversational moves.
We build on the mechanisms of SDRT (Asher & Lascarides 2003), with some modifications
and extensions: we deal with nested commitments by allowing the informative content of
discourse labels to talk about the content assigned to other discourse labels. As in SDRT,
we will assume given lower-level language, typically, Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL,
Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991), or DRT (Kamp & Reyle 1993), and extend this language with
discourse labels and relations.
Let I be a finite set of agents. Let Π =⊍i∈I Πi be a disjoint union of ∣I∣ countable sets of
symbols (discourse labels). By definition, agent i is the speaker of any label pi ∈ Πi, which
we write spk(pi) = i. LetR be a finite set of relation symbols.
We assume a basic language L0 with the following: L0 has a binary constructor ∧ and a unary
constructor ¬, i.e., ∀ϕ,ϕ ′ ∈ L0 ϕ ∧ϕ
′
,¬ϕ ∈ L0. We assume a class of models for L0, and
every modelM defines a set of states XM and an interpretation J⋅KM0 such that JϕK
M
0 ⊆X×X ,
J¬ϕKM0 = {(x,x) ∣ ¬∃x′(x,x′) ∈ JϕKM0 } and Jϕ ∧ψKM0 = JϕKM0 ○ JψKM0 = {(x,y) ∣ ∃z(x,z) ∈
JϕKM0 and (z,y) ∈ JψKM0 }. The latter requirements ensure that the interpretation of ¬ and ∧
coincide at the lower and upper levels.
Our intended base-level language is DPL, as it yields a rich and expressive discourse
semantics that can handle questions. However, in order to make clear the link between
the present section’s semantics and the dynamic logic of the previous section, we will also
occasionally use a simpler propositional test logic L
 ❡" 
(which can be seen as a fragment
of DPL). Simply define L
 ❡" 
as to contain the same formulae as the propositional logic
over signature PROP, states X
 ❡" 
are valuations PROP ↦ {0,1}, and for two valuations
v,v′ ∈ X
 ❡" 
, define JϕK
 ❡" 
= {⟨v,v⟩ ∣ v ⊧ ϕ}, where ⊧ is the classical truth-maker of the
(static) propositional logic over PROP.
The language LΠ,R extends L0 and is defined by structural induction:
Definition 8 LΠ,R is the smallest language such that:
∀ϕ ∈L0 ϕ ∈LΠ,R
∀pi1,pi2,pi3 ∈ Π∀R ∈R R(pi1,pi2,pi3) ∈LΠ,R
∀α ∈Lpi ∀i ∈ I Ciα ∈LΠ,R
∀α ∈Lpi ∀pi ∈ Π pi ∶ α ∈LΠ,R
∀α,α ′ ∈Lpi α ∧α
′
∈LΠ,R
∀pi,pi1,pi2 ∈ Π pi1
pi
∼pi2 ∈LΠ,R
∀α ∈Lpi ¬α ∈LΠ,R
An SDRS (segmented discourse representation structure) is a formula of LΠ,R such that
every occurrence of a formula of L0, or a formula of the form Ciα is guarded by some label
pi ∈ Π. In addition, define ϕ →ψ as ¬(ϕ ∧¬ψ).
LΠ,R adds several constructions to L0. First, there are statements of the form pi ∶ ϕ that
“store” the proposition ϕ in the content of a discourse label pi . It implements the linguistic
action of the speaker of pi’s saying ϕ . ϕ may itself be a structured discursive object, as in
SDRT. Relational propositions R(pi1,pi2,pi3) update the content of pi3 to express a relational
move, recursively computed through the meaning of R and the content assigned to pi1
and pi2. Commitment operators are added, as well as a construction pi1
pi
∼pi2, which will
implement ambiguity between the discourse moves stored under pi1 and pi2. We now turn to
the semantics of LΠ,R.
A model for LΠ,R is simply a modelM for L0. Let C = {c ∈ (Π)I ∣ ∀i ∈ I c(i) ∈ Πi}, the set
of function associating to each agent i a label c(i) whose speaker is i. The set of (LΠ,R-
)states SM for M is the product XM ×C×FM where FM is the set of assignments to
labels (also called label-assignments in the remainder of the paper). A state for the extended
language LΠ,R is thus a triple, consisting of a state x of the base language, a label c(i) for
each agent representing her current commitments2, and a label-assignment f . We define
label-assignments below. The purpose of a label-assignment f is to assign a (semantic)
proposition f (pi) to a given discourse label pi—i.e., in our dynamic logic, a set of transitions
between states. Such a transition is technically a pair ⟨(x,c, f ),(x′,c′, f ′)⟩, and itself involves
assignment functions. We must therefore be careful to avoid circularity in the definition of
FM, as is familiar from the work of Frank (1996) on modal subordination. Our problem
and our solution are, however, slightly different than those for modal subordination. We will
proceed in two steps. We will first define a set of bounded label-assignments, bounded in the
sense that it only allows for a finite nesting of labels with a defined content into other labels.
We give a semantics relative to such assignments of content to labels. The boundedness of
assignments has an intuitive semantic counterpart: in any state, regardless of the linguistic
actions executed so far, there is a finite bound n, for each agent i, on the maximal nesting of
commitments CiCi . . .Ciϕ that may evaluate to true for a non-tautological ϕ . In other words,
there is always a maximal n such that agent’s i commitments of order n are minimal (contain
nothing besides logical tautologies). This is analogous to what happens in the “weak”
dynamic commitment logic (without infinite sequences of acknowledgments) if we assume
assume an initial model with minimal commitments. An immediate consequence is that it’s
impossible to reach common commitment on any content. We make this correspondence
explicit below.
We will then extend our label-assignment functions to unbounded ones. Avoiding circularity
in this case will require a quite tricky mathematical construction; however, the complexity of
this construction will fade away thanks to two propositions stating that we can manipulate
unbounded assignments exactly as bounded ones (namely, that a label assignment can
evaluate any label into a set of state transitions, and that we can construct a new label-
assignment from any label assignment σ , set of transitions T and label pi by setting σ(pi) =
T ). The semantics with unbounded assignments will be exactly the same as for bounded
2 i.e., the label which is currently maximal w.r.t discourse subordination, this allows to dynamically
exclude labels which introduce only intermediary contributions that do not constitute a commitment
of their own, as e.g., antecedents to conditionals.
assignments.
In what follows, every definition is relative to a given modelM; in order to simplify notation
we drop the ⋅M when referring to the sets FM,XM,SM and interpretations J⋅KM0 and J⋅K
M.
We define by simultaneous induction the sets Fn of rank-n label-assignments, and Sn of rank
n states.
Definition 9 (Rank of assignments)
(i) F0 = ε , S0 = X ×C×F0
(ii) Fn+1 = (℘(Sn ×Sn))Π(functions from labels to set of transitions between rank-n states),
Sn+1 = X ×C×(⋃
k≤n
Fn)
(iii) F =⋃n<ω F
n, S = X ×C×F
Informally, a label-assignment of rank n, is either the special symbol ε , or a function from
discourse labels to a set of transitions (of rank n−1).
Our semantic requires only two operations on label-assignments: the evaluation of a label-
assignment f at a given label pi , and the substitution of a new set of transitions T for the set
of transitions previously assigned to pi yielding a new label-assignment denoted as f [T /pi].
To avoid circularity, however, we cannot define substitution by any set of transitions T ; it
suffices for our purposes to restrict the definition to bounded sets of transitions, bounded
in the sense that there must be some k < ω such that T ⊆ Sk ×Sk. ∆B ⊊ ℘(S×S) is the set of
such bounded sets of transitions (∆B =⋃n∈ω ℘(Sn×Sn)). The two operations (substitution
and evaluation) are defined below.
Definition 10 f (pi) is already defined for f ≠ ε , since by construction, f is a function.
We define in addition ε(pi) =⋃x∈X ,c∈C⟨(x,c,ε)(x,c,ε)⟩ (this choice of definition makes ε
represents a state with minimal commitments over logical tautologies only).
For T ∈ ∆B, pi ∈ Π, f [T /pi] is defined as the function f ′ such that:
{ f ′(pi) = T
∀pi ′ ≠ pi f ′(pi ′) = f (pi)
Note that, T ∈ ∆B is sufficient to ensure that f [T /pi] stays in F .
Since the semantics depends on the considered set of relations and their semantics, we
will assume that for every symbol R ∈ R, assignment f and top labels c, a semantics∣R(pi1,pi2)∣ fc ∈ ∆B is defined, which, given an assignment to pi1 and pi2 provides a new
proposition, that is to say, an element of ∆B. J⋅K interprets formulae into sets of transitions,
and is defined inductively as follows (using infix notation x δ y as a syntactic sugar for⟨x,y⟩ ∈ δ ):
Definition 11 (Semantics for LΠ,R)
− For ϕ ∈L0 s JϕK s
′ iff s = (x,c, f ), s′ = (x′,c, f ) and x JϕK0 x′
− (x,c, f )JR(pi1,pi2,pi3)K(x′,c′, f ′) iff c′ = c[pi3/spk(pi3)] and f ′ = f [(∣R(pi1,pi2)∣ fc )/pi3]
− s JCiαK s
′ iff s = s′ = ⟨x,c, f ⟩ and ∀⟨s,s′⟩ ∈ f (c(i))∃s′′ s′JαKs′′
− (x,c, f ) Jpi ∶ αK(x′,c′, f ′) iff f ′ = f [( f (pi)○ JαK)/pi]
− (x,c, f )Jpi1 pi∼pi2K(x′,c′, f ′) iff x= x′ and c′ = c[pi/spk(pi)] and f ′ = f [ f (pi1)∪ f (pi2)/pi]
− s J¬αK s′ iff s = s′ and there exists no s′′ ∈ S such that sJαKs′′
With c[pi/i] defined as the unique c′ such that c′(i) = pi and ∀ j ≠ i,c′( j) = c( j)
Since a bounded label-assignment f assigns a bounded set of transitions to any label, a easy
induction on α show that f (pi)○ JαK is always a bounded set of transitions as well, and thus
f [( f (pi)○ JαK)/pi] is always well defined and so is the semantics.
We provide in addition the semantics of two basic discourse relations: ❈♦♥#✐♥✉❛#✐♦♥ and
❆❝❦♥:
Definition 12
∣❈♦♥#✐♥✉❛#✐♦♥(pi1,pi2)∣ fc = f (pi1)○ f (pi2)
∣❆❝❦♥(pi1,pi2)∣ fc = {(⟨x,d,g⟩,⟨y,e(pi1/spk(pi1)),h[ f (pi1)/pi1]⟩) ∣(⟨x,d,g⟩,⟨y,e,h⟩) ∈ f (c(spk(pi2)))}
We can now link the propositional dynamic logic of the previous section and our dynamic
semantics. We define a translation from LD into LΠ,R taking L ❡" as lower-level language.
Let M0 = ⟨X ,(R0i )i∈I⟩ be the model of LD whose set of world X is the set of valuations over
signature PROP and R0i = X ×X (thus M
0 represents minimal commitments only to logical
truths by each agent in I).
Proposition 3 (translation) Algorithm 1, given as input a formula ϕ ∈ LD and an initial
“top” label c ∈C for each agent, yields a proposition t(ϕ,c) = χ ∈LΠ,R such that
⟨M0,x⟩ ⊧ ϕ iff ∃ f ∈ F (x,c,ε) JχK(x,c, f )
Consider ϕ = [(p! ∼ q!)i]([Ci p! j]C j/∧[ack(p! j) ∼ ack(q! j)][(Ci p)! j]¬C j/). This formula
of LD states that after i said something ambiguous between p and q, j is inconsistent in
Algorithm 1 translation of LD into LΠ,R
Assume a function ❢!❡#❤ ∶ I↦Π which enumerates each Πi, i.e., such that each call
❢!❡#❤(i) returns a label in Πi and successive calls never return twice the same label.
1: function t(ϕ,c) ▷ ϕ ∈LD∪A, c ∈C
2: Case ϕ = p ∈ PROP :
3: Return p
4: Case ϕ =Ciϕ :
5: Return Ci t(ϕ,c)
6: Case ϕ ∧ψ :
7: Return t(ϕ,c)∧ t(ψ,c)
8: Case ϕ = [α i]ψ :
9: Let χα = t(α i,c) and χψ = t(ψ,c)
10: Return χα → χψ
11: Case ϕ =ψ!i :
12: Return c(i) ∶ t(ψ,c)
13: Case ϕ = ack(β x)i :
14: Let piβ = ❢!❡#❤(x)
15: Let χβ = t(β
x
,c[piβ /x])
16: Return c(i) ∶ χβ
17: Case ϕ = (α ∼ β)i :
18: Let piα = ❢!❡#❤(i) and piβ = ❢!❡#❤(i)
19: Let χα = t(α,c[piα/i]) and χβ = t(β ,c[piβ /i])
20: Return χα ∧χβ ∧piα
c(i)
∼ piβ
21: end Case
22: end function
saying that i is committed to p, unless he first (ambiguously) acknowledges one of the two
readings. ϕ is true in (any world of)M0. The translation of ϕ is the formula χ below (where
symbols with a ⋅x exponent denote labels in Πx):
(pi i1 ∶ p∧pi i2 ∶ q∧pi i1 pi i∼ pi i2)→
((pi j ∶Ci p)→C j/)∧((pi j1 ∶ pi i ∶ p∧pi j2 ∶ pi i ∶ q∧pi j1 pi j∼ pi j2)→ ((pi j ∶Ci p)→ ¬C j/)))
χ first updates the content of labels pi i1 and pi
i
2, set the content of pi
i to be the union of the
content of those two labels, then set pi i to be i’s top label. Since this first state leaves the
assignment to label pi j unchanged, If the initial assigment is ε , pi j contains no transition
making Ci p hold, hence executing the action pi
j ∶Ci p would empty pi
j and commits j to the
absurdum. The ambiguous action (pi j1 ∶ (pi i ∶ p)∧pi j2 ∶ (pi i ∶ q)∧pi j1 pi j∼ pi j2) on the other hand
upates pi j to contain at least one transition placing p in the content of pi i, which can then
be selected through pi j ∶Ci p, and won’t empties j’s commitments. Thus, a state ⟨x,c,ε⟩ is
accepted by χ .
We now extend our semantics with assignments interpreting infinite descending chains of
labels with defined content. This enables us to do two things: 1) deal with infinite sequences
of ❆❝❦♥ and 2) have states in which agents are commonly committed to some non-tautological
content. We build unbounded label-assignments over bounded ones. by exploiting a notion
of bounded bisimulation over bounded label-assignments. In the following, x¯ will generally
denote a tuple ⟨x,c⟩ ∈ X ×C.
Definition 13 We define n-bisimilarity (≅n) between bounded label-assignments inductively:
− ∀ f , f ′ ∈ F f ≅0 f
′.
− f0 ≅n+1 f1 iff the two following conditions hold:
(forth) ∀pi∀⟨(x¯,g0),(x¯′,g′0)⟩ ∈ f (pi)∃⟨(x¯,g1)(x¯′,g′1)⟩ ∈ f ′(pi) such that g1 ≅n g′1 and
g0 ≅n g
′
0.
(back) ∀pi∀⟨(x¯,g1),(x¯′,g′1)⟩ ∈ f ′(pi)∃⟨(x¯,g0)(x¯′,g′0)⟩ ∈ f (pi) such that g1 ≅n g′1 and
g0 ≅n g
′
0.
To ease notational clutter, we extend the notation ≅n to pairs of transitions, by writing⟨(x¯, f ),(y¯,g)⟩ ≅n ⟨(x¯′, f ′),(y¯′,g′)⟩ as a shortcut for x¯ = y¯, x¯′ = y¯′ and f ≅n f ′ and g ≅n g′. We
are now ready to define unbounded assignments:
Definition 14 (Unbounded label-assignments) The set of unbounded label-assignments Fω is
defined as the set of infinite sequences σ = ⟨σ0,σ1, . . . ,σi, . . .⟩ of bounded label-assignments,
such that: (i) ∀i σi ≅i+1 σi+1 and (ii) ∀i σi ∈ F
i+1.
This construction allows us, at each index, to find a label-assignment that is compatible with
and refines the assignment of the preceding indices, allowing us to evaluate arbitrarily deep
nestings of discourse labels by picking an assignment at a sufficiently high index.
Let Sω = X ×C×Fω denote the new set of states, now based on unbounded assignments (the
analog to S). Corresponding transitions are thus in Sω ×Sω .
Definition 15 let σ ,σ ′ ∈ Fω , σ ≅ σ
′ iff ∀iσi ≅i+1 σ
′
i . ≅ is an equivalence relation.
We extend the notation ≅ to pairs of transitions, as we did for finite bisimulation. Finally, we
introduce the notion of a diagonal, which will prove useful later on:
Definition 16 (Diagonal) Let ⟨si = (x¯,σ i)⟩i∈ω be a sequence of states with constant first
components x¯ = ⟨x,c⟩, and such that σ00 ≅1 σ11 ≅2 σ22 . . .σnn ≅n+1 σn+1n+1 we call the diagonal of
such a sequence, the state δ(⟨si⟩i∈ω) = ⟨x¯,⟨σ ii ⟩i∈ω⟩
The last ingredients needed for our dynamic semantics with unbounded assignments are
evaluation and substitution, which we now define:
Definition 17 (Evaluation) Let σ ∈ Fω . Define σ(pi) as:
σ(pi) = {⟨(x¯,α),(y¯,β)⟩ ∣∀i⟨(x¯,αi),(y¯,βi)⟩ ∈ σi+1(pi) and α,β ∈ Fω}
For any equivalence relation ⋈, let x = y[⋈] denote equality modulo ⋈.
Proposition 4 if σ ≅ σ ′ then σ(pi) = σ ′(pi)[≅]
An unbounded assignment always assigns to a label a set of transitions closed under diagonal;
i.e., whenever ∀k ∈ ω ⟨sk,s′k⟩ ∈ σ(pi), such that both δs = (⟨sk⟩k∈ω) and δs′ = δ(⟨s′k⟩k∈ω) are
defined, we have ⟨(δs,δs′)⟩ ∈ σ(pi).
We now define the substitution operation. As in the bounded case, we must ensure that the
set of transitions T we substitute is of the same kind that an unbounded label assignment can
have as output. This time the restriction is not one of boundedness, but instead, following
the previous remark, that T be closed under diagonal.
Definition 18 (Substitution) Let T ⊆ Sω ×Sω such that T is closed under diagonal. Define
Ti = {⟨(x¯,αi),(y¯,βi)⟩ ∣ ⟨(x¯,α),(y¯,β)⟩ ∈ T}. For pi ∈ Π and σ ∈ Fω define σ[T /pi] as
σ ′ = σ0[T0/pi] ⋅σ1[T1/pi] ⋅ . . .σn[Tn/pi] ⋅ . . .
Note that since by definition of Fω , Ti ∈ S
i+1×Si+1 ⊆ ∆B, σi[Ti/pi] is well defined.
The final proposition we need is:
Proposition 5 σ[T /pi] ∈ Fω . Furthermore σ[T /pi](pi) = T [≅].
Propositions 4 and 5 together imply that we can define our semantics exactly as we did for
bounded assignments in definition 11, provided that the interpretation of discourse relations
satisfies the following constraint: for every relation symbol R and assigment f , ∣R(pi1,pi2)∣ f
is closed under diagonalization. This holds for our definition of ❈♦♥#✐♥✉❛#✐♦♥ and ❆❝❦♥.
Diagonalization captures precisely the regularity required for an infinite sequence of actions
to be representable as a simple model update, which, as we have seen, is the case for
acknowledgments. The very reason that allowed us, in the previous section, to capture an
infinite sequence of iterated acknowledgment in a finite action-structure, was that level n
actions of the hierarchy of acknowledgments only affects commitments of order n. The
model obtained after any acknowledgment of order 1 is 0-bisimilar to the initial model
(actual facts are not modified). Applying second-order acknowledgments modifies only
second order commitments, and the model after this second step is 1-bisimilar to the model
at step one. Applying the successive levels of the acknowledgments hierarchy thus yields a
sequence of models such that the nth is n− bisimilar to the (n+1)th. The finite action-structure
semantically equivalent to iterated acknowledgments, because it yields through update a
single model, which is, for every integer n, n−bisimilar to the nth model in the infinite
sequence of updates. As the exact same relationship holds between an infinite sequence⟨σk⟩k∈ω of assignment which admits a diagonal and its diagonal, we can use infinite iterated
acknowledgments in our dynamic semantics. To that end we introduce a new relation ❆❝❦♥ω .
Just as with the propositional infinite sequence of actions of section 3, we define first an
infinite sequence of actions. Let pi ∈ Π,c ∈C and for i, j ∈ I let ⟨pik
ok
j
i
⟩k∈ω be a sequence of
pairwise disjoint labels in Πi. Define level-n iterated acknowledgments of pi , χ
ack
n , with
χ0 =⋀i, j∈I ❆❝❦♥(pi,pi0
ok
j
i
,c(i)) and ∀n χn+1 = χn∧⋀i, j∈I ❆❝❦♥(c( j),pik
ok
j
i
,c(i)). Let x ∈ X and
f ∈ F and define ⟨x,cn, fn⟩ as the unique state such that ⟨x,c, f ⟩ JχnK ⟨x,cn, fn⟩. ∀n cn = c,
moreover the sequence ⟨x,c, fn⟩n∈ω admits a diagonal. Let δ ack⟨x,c, f ⟩ denote this diagonal. We
can finally add a construction ❆❝❦♥ω(pi,(pi i)i∈I) to the language, which , first, copy each
agent i’s commitment into pi i (in order to not erase the content of the current top labels
and keep track of previous states), and then to proceed to iterate acknowledgments. Define
therefore for a pair ⟨c, f ⟩, the pair c¯ = c[(pi i/i)i∈I] and f¯ = f [( f (c(i))/pi i)i∈I], this performs
the “copy” of each agent’s commitment into the new labels. Define:
s J❆❝❦♥ω(pi,(pi i)i∈I)K s′ iff s = ⟨x,c, f ⟩ and s′ = δ ack⟨x,c¯, f¯ ⟩
5 Examples revisited
In previous sections, we defined a propositional dynamics logic describing the evolution
of commitments, and a full dialog semantics with relational moves with the same logical
mechanisms. Furthermore, these systems describe both possibilities of a “strong”or “weak”
semantics, linking them through iterated acknowledgments. But we still have to solve our
dilemma: neither a systematic “strong” interpretation of dialog moves, nor a “weak” one
is satisfactory, as it either yields meaningless acknowledging moves or impossibility of
grounding. However, as both kind of interpretations are now part of a common semantic
vocabulary, we are no longer committed to a systematic use of one or the other. The
remaining question is thus: what is exactly the condition at which an agreement is reached
that synchronous iterated acknowledgements indeed happened?
Our answer to this question is: one has to ask. Our solution builds on our treatment of
ambiguity: acknowledgments, such as the one that 1 performs in (2c) of example (2), are
considered as ambiguous in their strength and only a confirming question and answer might
raise this ambiguity, and reach a non-deniable common-commitment. Considering again
1’s acknowledgment in (2c), we represent 1’s contribution (OK), as ambiguous between
a simple acknowledgment by 1 and an acknowledgment of a common acknowledgment
of 0’s “no” answer. Representing 0’s “no” as the action ¬❜❛♥❦!0, (2c) is thus modeled as
ack(❜❛♥❦!1) ∼ ack(!ω0,1(❜❛♥❦!0))1). In the relational semantics, we have (2b) as pi0 ∶ ¬❜❛♥❦,
followed by
❆❝❦♥
ω(pi0,(pi0strong,pi1strong))∧pi0 pi ′0∼ pi0strong∧❆❝❦♥(pi0,pi1OK ,pi1weak)∧pi1weak pi1∼ pi1strong.
This move commits 1 (via pi1) to an ambiguous proposition. The subsequent confirming
question in 2c, is then modeled as asking 0 to raise the ambiguity. We did not discuss the
semantics of questions, but questions in dynamics semantics have been discussed at length
in the litterature (see e.g., Groenendijk 2003). We could modifies states as to include issue
partitions in order to represent questions. The recent account in dynamic epistemic logic of
van Benthem & Minica (2012) could also be integrated into section 3’s dynamics. What is
crucial independently of this choice, is that 1’s commitments indeed licences a polar question
C∗C0¬bank?, to which 0 answering yes
3 brings a commitment C0C
∗C0¬bank. After such
a move, whatever 0 may say, he cannot deny, at any level, that he committed to ¬bank. A
simple acknowldegment of 0’s answer yield the common commitment.
Our relational semantics also allows us to deal with self-corrections. Corrections need the
full relational semantics, because one content is revised by another. Consider example
(2) again and 0’s correction in (2d). When B says No. sorry, in fact, I had an account
there, the move attaches to B’s affirmative answer to P’s initial question in (2a). But the
effects of this discourse move change the surrounding discourse structure. The semantics of
Correction replaces the content of the original affirmative answer with the negative answer in
the corrective move. Because of this, the follow up question of P and B’s second affirmative
answer are now moot. As in Lascarides & Asher 2009, this revision requires that our states
have a copy of the SDRS constructed for the dialogue and the revision is calculated on that
structure. B and P’s commitments are recomputed on the revised SDRS. We thus model
self-corrections as a revision of one’s commitments.
Self-corrections thus erase the commitments of the corrected action and possibly also
the commitments ensuing from subsequent dependent actions like its acknowledgment.
An immediate consequence is that self-corrections make commitments, even common
commitments, unstable (non-monotonic).
3 which will disambiguate his own commitments in pi ′0 by selecting the content of pi
0
strong
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